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CHRIS GuTnm.E*
Options, options, options ....
The Negotiation literature-at least the "problem-solving" or "interest-
based" or "principled" negotiation literature'repeats this mantra over and
over and over.2 It seems self-evident that having lots of options is a good
idea because more options means more to choose from. The more options
there are to choose from, however, the more difficult choosing can be.
Options, in short, may increase the likelihood that one will make an optimal
decision,3 but they impose added "decision costs" on the decision maker.
Law professors now face this happy dilemma when choosing materials
for their Negotiation courses. Options abound-including the negotiation
chapters in dispute resolution casebooks, 4 negotiation books written for legal
* Acting Associate Dean, Associate Professor of Law & Senior Fellow at the Center for
the Study of Dispute Resolution, University of Missouri School of Law. B.A. 1989,
Stanford; Ed.M. 1991 Harvard; J.D. 1994, Stanford. I am grateful to Jonathan Cohen,
Tracey George, and Richard Shell for their comments. I am also grateful to Johanna
Harrington for her capable research assistance and the University of Missouri Law
School Foundation for financial support.
1 E.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991); see RICHARD E. WALTON &
ROBERT B. McKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS
OFA SOCIALINTERACTION SYSTEM 126-83 (1965); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV.
754,758 (1984).
2 FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 56-80; WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 1, at 148-
53; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 801-17.
3 Contra Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 287, 287 (1996) (demonstrating that the presence of additional options can
impede economically rational decision making).
4 E.g., EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND MATERIALS 27-183 (1997); STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 17-102 (2d ed. 1992); JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE
219
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
audiences,5 negotiation books written for non-legal audiences, 6 and a
number of good articles 7-but choosing among them is no easy matter.
Richard Shell-a Professor of Legal Studies at the Wharton School of
Business-has made this task even more difficult with the publication of his
important book, Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for
Reasonable People.8 Such luminaries in the negotiation field as Max
Bazerman (Kellogg Graduate School of Business), Rod Kramer (Stanford
Business School), Howard Raiffa (Harvard Business School), and Larry
Susskind (MIT Public Policy) have enthusiastically endorsed the book.9
Noticeably absent, however, is any commentary from the legal academy
about the book's value to law students and lawyers. 10
This review essay seeks to fill that void. My modest aim is to help law
professors decide whether Bargaining for Advantage is worth adopting in
whole or part in their Negotiation courses. In other words, I hope to play
some small role in helping Negotiation teachers in law schools make optimal
adoption decisions (at least with respect to this book) while minimizing the
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 73-292 (2d ed. 1996); LEONARD L. RISKIN &
JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 148-311 (2d ed. 1997).
5 E.g., CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (2d ed.
1993); DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1989);
THOMAS F. GUERNSEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NEGOTIATION (1996); ROBERTH.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: How LAWYERS HELP CLIENTS CREATE VALUE IN
NEGOTIATION (forthcoming 2000).
6 E.g., MAx H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY (1992);
FISHER Er AL., supra note 1; DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS
NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986); ROY J.
LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION (2d ed. 1994); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION (1982); LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR
(1998).
7 E.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1661 (1997); Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal
Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1985); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal
Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789 (2000); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative
Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369 (1996).
8 G. RICHARD SHELL (1999).
9 Bazerman, Raiffa, and Susskind provided advance commentary on Bargaining for
Advantage, while Kramer praised its virtues in a recent Negotiation Journal review.
Roderick M. Kramer, Troubled Talk and Talking Cures: From 'Smart Talk' to Wise
Conversations, 16 NEGOT. J. 143, 147-49 (2000).
10 While this review was being edited, The Harvard Negotiation Law Review published a
short review of Shell's book. John Richardson, A Review of Bargaining for Advantage, 5
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 399 (2000). Though published in The Harvard Negotiation Law
Review, Richardson's review is not specifically targeted at law students, law professors,
or practicing lawyers.
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decision costs of doing so. To that end, I provide a brief synopsis of
Bargaining for Advantage, identify its primary pedagogical strengths (and
one significant, weakness), and conclude by explaining how I use the book in
my Negotiation course.
I. OVERVIEW OF BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE
Negotiation is an inherently interdisciplinary enterprise. 11  No
negotiation teacher can teach the course without relying, even if only
implicitly, on such disciplines as Economics and Psychology. Given the
interdisciplinary nature of the subject, Richard Shell is the ideal author of a
book on negotiation because he is a lawyer with expertise in social
psychology who teaches in a leading business school. As a member of the
Legal Studies Department of the Wharton School, Shell has developed a
reputation as a "star teacher" of undergraduates, MBA students, and business
executives and he has written a number of important articles on negotiation
and related topics.' 2
Consistent with his background, Shell has written an overtly
interdisciplinary negotiation text that bridges the gap between the popular
"how to" negotiation books on the one hand and the rich, but largely
inaccessible, body of negotiation scholarship on the other. 13 Using the
common sense that informs the former and the theoretical and empirical
insights which inform the latter, Shell proposes a "situational" approach to
negotiation14 which he labels "information-based bargaining" (JBB).15 Shell
devotes the first half of his book to the six "foundations" of IBB and the
lattdr half to the negotiation process.
11Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
24 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (noting the "inherently interdisciplinary nature of
the field of dispute resolution").
12 E.g., Arvind Rangaswamy & G. Richard Shell, Using Computers to Achieve Joint
Gains in Negotiation: Toward an "Electronic Bargaining Table", 43 MGMT. Sci. 1147
(1997); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 431
(1993) [hereinafter Contracts]; G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the
Negotiation of Commercial Contracts. Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 221 (1991) [hereinafter Opportunism]; G. Richard Shell, When is it Legal to Lie in
Negotiations?, 32 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 93 (1991) [hereinafter Legal to Lie].
13 SiEL, supra note 8, at xiii.
14 id. at xii.
15 Id. atxv.
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A. Part I-The Six Foundations of Information-Based Bargaining
In contrast to books that prescribe the "one best way" to negotiate,
Shell's information-based bargaining approach "emphasizes 'situational
strategies' tailored to the facts of each case .... -16 Shell contends that the
six most important factors to consider are as follows: (1) bargaining style;
(2) goals and expectations; (3) standards and norms; (4) relationships; (5) the
other party's interests; and (6) leverage. Shell addresses each of these, in
turn, in the first six chapters of Bargaining for Advantage.
1. Foundation #1-Bargaining Style
The first foundation of lBB is one's negotiation or conflict style. "Your
personal negotiation style," Shell argues, "is a critical variable in bargaining.
If you don't know what your instincts and intuition will tell you to do under
different conditions, you will have a great deal of trouble planning effective
strategies and responses.' 7 Shell provides a succinct introduction to the five
familiar conflict styles--competitive, accommodating, avoiding,
compromising, and collaborative' 8-and invites the reader to perform a
thought experiment to assess her own default style(s). Shell is not optimistic
about a negotiator's ability to depart from her preferred conflict style(s), 19
but he does believe that all negotiators, regardless of their default style(s),
can develop into more effective negotiators if they prepare more
intelligently, develop high expectations, concentrate on listening in
negotiation, and maintain a commitment to personal integrity.20
2. Foundation #2-Goals and Expectations
Goals are the second foundation of IBB. "You cannot know when to say
'yes' and when to say 'no' without first knowing what you are trying to
achieve." 21 Shell argues that negotiators should set the most optimistic, yet
16 Id. at xv.
171d. at8.
18 See Ralph H. Kilmann & Kenneth W. Thomas, Developing a Forced-Choice Measure
of Conflict-Handling Behavior The 'Mode' Instrument, 37 EDUC. & PSYCHOL.
MEASUREMENT 309 (1977) (introducing their five conflict styles); see also SHELL, supra
note 8, at 243.
19 SHELL, supra note 8, at 9.
20 Id. at 15-18.
21 Id. at 24.
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justifiable, goals possible,22and that negotiators should commit themselves
to their goals by writing them down and speaking to colleagues about
them.23 "[R]esearch on setting goals discloses a simple but powerful fact:
The more specific your vision of what you want and the more committed you
are to that vision, the more likely you are to obtain it."24
3. Foundation #3-Norms and Standards
Authoritative norms and standards constitute the third foundation of
IBB. "[T]he need to maintain consistency with established standards
influences virtually all negotiations." 25 Shell explains that negotiators feel a
psychological need to adhere to authoritative norms and standards.26 Thus,
negotiators who appeal to authoritative norms and standards acquire what
Shell calls "normative leverage," particularly "when the standards, norms,
and themes.., are ones the other party views as legitimate and relevant to
the resolution of your differences."27
4. Foundation #4-Relationships
The fourth foundation of IBB is the "ability to form and manage
personal associations at the bargaining table" because such associations
"create a level of trust and confidence between people that eases anxiety and
facilitates communication. '28 To develop productive working relationships
at the bargaining table, negotiators need to build trust, and trust i~s based on
reciprocity. 29 Reciprocity is thus the psychological key that opens the door
to trust in relationships. Shell urges negotiators to use this psychological key
in three ways: First, "[y]ou should always be trustworthy and reliable
yourself' because "[y]ou have no right to ask of others what you cannot be
yourself."30 Second, you should also "be fair to those who are fair to you. 31
Finally, "you should let others know about it when you think they have
22 Id. at 31.
23 Id. at 34-35.
24 Id. at 24.
25 Id. at 15.
26 1& at 42-55.
2 7 Id. at43.
2 8 Id. at58.
2 9 Id. at 70.
3 0 Id. at61.
31 Id.
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treated you unfairly. 32
5. Foundation #5-Other Party's Interests
Having addressed one side of the "interests" equation in chapter two,33
Shell examines the other side of the equation in chapter five. The other
party's interests constitute the fifth foundation of IBB. "Effective
negotiators," Shell explains, "exhibit a very important trait: the ability to see
the world from the other party's point of view. To succeed at negotiation,
you must learn to ask how it might be in the other party's interests to help
you achieve your goals." 34 Shell recognizes, of course, that this is easier said
than done, so he proposes that negotiators follow four steps to identify and
meet the other side's interests. First, negotiators should identify the relevant
decision maker(s) on the other side.35 Second, negotiators should search for
common ground. 36 Third, negotiators should try to identify interests that
might interfere with agreement. 37 Fourth, negotiators should search for low-
cost options that advance their own goals while addressing the other party's
interests. 38 In contrast to scholars who believe that different interests are the
key to success in negotiation, 39 Shell contends that "[sihared interests are
the 'elixir of negotiation,' the salve that can smooth the way over the issues
which you and the other party genuinely disagree about."40
6. Foundation #6-Leverage
The sixth foundation of IBB is leverage, which Shell contends is "the
most important factor for high-stakes bargaining. '41 Leverage "is your
32 Id.
33 See supra Part I.A.2.
34 SHELL, supra note 8, at 76-77.
35 Id. at 78.
36 Id. at 79.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 81.
39 Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1, 8 (1995) ("Students in negotiation courses often
erroneously believe that win-win negotiations somehow depend on finding similarities-
common interests shared by both sides. In fact, it is characteristically differences in
preferences, relative valuations, predictions about the future, and risk preferences that
fuel value-creating opportunities.").
4 0 Id. at 84-85 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 89-90.
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power not just to reach agreement, but to obtain an agreement on your own
terms. Research has shown that, with leverage, even an average negotiator
will do pretty well while without leverage only highly-skilled bargainers
achieve their goals." 42 To ascertain which party possesses leverage in a
negotiation, Shell encourages negotiators to give themselves the following
test:
Ask yourself, as of the moment when you make the assessment, which
party has the most to lose from no deal. The party with the most to lose has
the least leverage; the party with the least to lose has the most leverage; and
both parties have roughly equal leverage when they both stand to lose
equivalent amounts should the deal fall through.43
B. Part II-Negotiation Process
Having explained the six foundations of information-based bargaining in
Part I of Bargaining for Advantage, Shell moves on in Part II to describe
"the predictable path that negotiations follow." 44 Shell contends that
"[n]egotiation is a dance that moves through four stages or steps": 45 (1)
preparation; (2) information exchange; (3) opening and making concessions;
and (4) commitment. 46 Shell also devotes a chapter to ethical issues, which
"suffuse every aspect and stage of the negotiation process." 47
1. Stage #1-Preparation
Shell recommends that negotiators prepare . for negotiation
situationally. 48 Although no two negotiations are exactly alike, Shell
contends that negotiations fall generally into one of four categories based on
42 1d. at90.
43 Id. at 105.
44Id. at xv.
45 Id. at 119.
46 For example, for different categorizations of the stages of negotiation, see GUERNSEY,
supra note 5, at 12, identifying the ten stages of negotiation as (1) preparation and
planning, (2) ice breaking, (3) agenda control, (4) information bargaining, (5) proposals,
offers, demands, (6) persuasion/justification, (7) concessions/reformulation, (8) crisis:
resolution or deadlock, (9) closing, and (10) memorialization; and see GERALD R.
WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SEITLEMENT 70-86 (1983),identifying the four
stages of negotiation as (1) orientation and positioning, (2) argumentation, (3) emergence
and crisis, and (4) agreement or final breakdown.
47 SHELL, supra note 8, at 201.
48 Id. at 119.
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two variables: the perceived conflict over stakes ("stakes conflict") and the
perceived importance of any future relationship between the parties
("relationship concerns"). 49
Using these two variables, Shell constructs a "situational matrix"
comprised of four categories, each of which reflects a different combination
of conflict over stakes and concerns about the relationship: (1) "Tacit
Coordination"-intersection over which one proceeds first characterized by
both low stakes conflict and low relationship concerns (e.g., a "negotiation"
between two drivers at a four-way) ; (2) "Transactions"--characterized by
high stakes conflict and low relationship concerns (e.g., purchase and sale of
a home); (3) "Relationships"---characterized by relatively low stakes conflict
and high relationship concerns (e.g., working within a team); and (4)
"Balanced Concerns"--characterized by both high stakes conflict and high
relationship concerns (e.g., negotiations over a joint venture or other
business partnership) .50
Once a negotiator has determined the category into which her
negotiation falls, she should then attempt to select the optimal negotiation
approach for that category. Shell contends, for instance, that negotiators
should strive to avoid conflict in 'Tacit Coordination" negotiations. 51 In
"Balanced Concerns" negotiations, by contrast, negotiators should plan to
collaborate or problem-solve with their counterparts. 52
2. Stage #2-Information Exchange
Following preparation, negotiators engage in what Shell calls the
"information exchange" stage of negotiation, which is "often the most
overlooked part of the process. '53 During this stage of the negotiation,
negotiators engage in three distinct activities. First, negotiators attempt to
establish rapport with one another. Here, Shell describes the so-called
"liking rule,"54 which posits that negotiators are more likely to get what they
want from their counterparts when their counterparts like them.55 Second,
negotiators attempt to elicit information from one another regarding each
49 Id. at 120.
50 Id. at 120-27.
5 1 Id. at 121.
52 Id. at 127.
53 Id. at 134.
5 4 Id. at 136-37. For more on this phenomenon, see ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 167-207 (2d ed. 1993).
55 SHELL, supra note 8, at 136.
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others' interests, the issues subject to discussion, and each others'
perceptions regarding these issues. 56 Skilled negotiators, Shell reports,
"focus more than average negotiators on receiving, as opposed to delivering,
information." 57 Relying on empirical studies,58 Shell reports that highly-
skilled negotiators ask twice as many questions as average negotiators, listen
better, test their understanding of the other sides' perspectives more often,
and frequently summarize what they have heard.59 Thus, Shell contends,
negotiators should "probe first, disclose later."60 Third, and finally,
negotiators signal their expectations and posture a bit regarding their
leverage. 61
3. Stage #3-Opening and Making Concessions
Once parties have prepared for the negotiation and have exchanged
information with one another, "it is time to bargain."'62 At this stage,
negotiators must confront two key decisions in virtually every negotiation:
how to open and how to concede. Consistent with his situational approach,
Shell offers different bargaining strategies depending upon the situation.63
With respect to opening offers, Shell contends that negotiators should
open if they think they have a better understanding of the value of the
negotiation than their counterparts. 64 Opening allows negotiators to "anchor"
their counterparts' expectations. 65 Shell further contends that negotiators in
many instances should open "optimistically" rather than "reasonably. '66 For
Shell, an optimistic opening is "the highesi (or lowest) number for which
there is a supporting standard or argument enabling you to make a
presentable case."67
With respect to concession making, Shell again approaches the question
situationally. Shell notes, for example, that empirical research supports a
56 Id. at 137.
57 Id. at 144.
5 8 E.g., Neil Rackham & John Carlisle, The Effective Negotiator-Part 1: The Behavior of
Successful Negotiators, 2 J. EUROPEAN INDUS. TRAINING 6 (1978).
59 SHELL, supra note 8, at 145.
60 1d. at 144.
61 Id. at 148-49.
6 2 Id at 156.
63 See id. at 132-55.
64 Id. at57.
65 Id. at 159-60.
66 Id. at 160-61.
67 Id. at 161.
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"start high, then concede gradually" strategy in most transactional
negotiations involving the division of limited resources. 68 If, however, a
transaction involves many issues, parties should seek to implement an
integrative bargaining strategy by making "big moves on your 'little' (less
important) issues and little moves on your 'big' (most important) issues."69
4. Stage #4-Commitment
Following information exchange and the give-and-take of bargaining,
negotiators move toward closing and commitment. Negotiators can, and
should, use a variety of tactics to conclude deals, including deadlines, "take
it or leave it" ultimatums, final offers, and "split the difference" proposals. 70
In their haste to close, however, negotiators need to be wary of a
phenomenon psychologists have labeled "overcommitment." 71 Psychologists
have found that people are reluctant to admit failure or accept loss once they
have invested heavily in a particular course of action. Thus, "[a]s we invest
increasingly significant amounts of time, energy, and other resources in the
actual negotiation process, we become more and more committed to
closing" 72 This phenomenon may lead negotiators to make undesirable last
minute concessions. In short, "[t]he final stage of negotiation, closing and
gaining commitment, poses some significant challenges." 73
5. Ethics
Finally, Shell addresses negotiation ethics, a topic he has thoughtfully
examined in prior published work.74 In Bargaining for Advantage, Shell
describes three different approaches to, or schools of, ethics: (1) The Poker
School (i.e., "it's a game"); (2) The Idealist School (i.e., "do the right thing
even if it hurts"); and (3) The Pragmatist School (i.e., "what goes around,
comes around"). 75 He hopes negotiators will aspire to the idealist approach
but acknowledges that reasonable people will have different views of ethical
68 Id. at 165.
69 Id. at 170.
7 0 Id. at 181-91.
71 Id. at 186.
72 1d. at 187.
73 Id. at 199.
74 See generally Contracts, supra note 12; Opportunism, supra note 12; Legal to Lie,
supra note 12.
75 SHELL, supra note 8, at 215.
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questions in negotiation. Whatever school or approach one adopts, Shell
argues that negotiators should be able to explain and defend their particular
ethical choices in negotiation. "Reasonable people will differ on ethical
questions," Shell acknowledges, "but you will have personal integrity in my
estimation if you can pass my 'explain and defend' test after making a
considered, ethical choice. ' 76
II. EVALUATING BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE As A LAW SCHOOL
TEXT
There is surprising uniformity among the Negotiation courses taught in
schools of law, business, public policy, and international relati6ns on our
nation's campuses.77 Researchers have found, for instance, the use of "a
common vocabulary for teaching negotiation," the "widespread use of cases
and simulations," and "widespread attention to ethics."78
Despite this uniformity, I suspect that most of us who teach Negotiation
(or any other course for that matter) feel that we do so in our own, unique
way. From the development of a syllabus at the beginning of a class to the
evaluation of student work at the end (and especially everything in between),
teaching is a very personal endeavor. Thus, rather than urge Negotiation
teachers to run out and adopt Bargaining for Advantage, I intend to identify
below what I have found to be its primary strengths and lone weakness as an
assigned text in my Negotiation course. Although I believe its considerable
pedagogical strengths outweigh its one significant weakness, each
Negotiation teacher can draw her own conclusions about its pedagogical
value.
76 Id at 206.
77 Harvard's Program on Negotiation (PON) recently conducted a survey of faculty
teaching Negotiation in law, business, public policy, and international relations schools at
a variety of universities around the country. Researchers for the survey found
"considerable redundancy within and across the professors interviewed." Sara Cobb, An
Overview of a Research Survey, NEGOTIATION PEDAGOGY (PON, Harvard Law School) at
3 (on file with author).
78 1d. at6.
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A. Strengths
Like the Getting to Yes series of books,79 Bargaining for Advantage is
an engaging read. As one of my students put it, Bargaining for Advantage is
"one of those books that when you start reading the first page, you can't let
the book go out of your hands before the last page." 80 Bargaining for
Advantage is engaging because its prose is clear and crisp, making liberal
use of anecdotes to illuminate abstract propositions about negotiation. It also
includes a number of charts, tables, and matrices to break up the text,
summarize key points, and present the material in varying ways.
Bargaining for Advantage's engaging style is more than matched by its
substance. Three substantive strengths, in particular, stand out. First,
Bargaining for Advantage carefully balances several significant tensions that
confront the Negotiation teacher: the academic versus the practical, the
descriptive versus the prescriptive, the actuarial versus the anecdotal, and
self-interest versus other-interest. Second, Bargaining for Advantage
skillfully integrates theoretical and empirical scholarship drawn from a
variety of disciplines. Third, Bargaining for Advantage supplements and
extends in important respects the preferred model of negotiation teaching
and training: the problem-solving or principled model of negotiation.
1. Balanced Approach
Every Negotiation teacher faces certain tensions. How much of my
course should be theoretical and how much practical? Should I emphasize
descriptive accounts of the negotiation process, or should I focus on
providing negotiation prescriptions to help students maximize their
outcomes? Should I base the prescriptions I provide on actuarial information,
which is generally more reliable than anecdotal information, 81 or should I
7 9 See generally FISHER & URY, ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI (1994);
ROGER FISHER & ScoTr BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS AS WE
NEGOTIATE (1989); WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM
CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION (1993).
80 E-mail from Hossam Fahmy, LL.M., Washington University School of Law, to Chris
Guthrie, Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law (April 19,
2000) (on file with author); see also E-mail from Daniel Rubin, J.D., Washington
University School of Law to Chris Guthrie, Associate Professor Law, University of
Missouri School of Law (May 4, 2000) (on file with author) ("Overall, I thought the book
was very well-written and insightful and would definitely tell students to approach it with
higher expectations than they would the typical teaching tool.").
81 Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCI. 1668, 1671
(1989).
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rely more heavily on anecdotal information, which is generally more
compelling and memorable than actuarial information? 82 What obligation do
I have to encourage self-interest (and client-interest) on the one hand versus
concern for others on the other hand?
Although each teacher must decide how to resolve these issues for
herself, Shell does all of us a service by deftly balancing them in Bargaining
for Advantage. Shell provides a rich theoretical account of negotiation,
drawing explicitly upon research from social science disciplines, but also
provides practical insights into the negotiation process. 83 He uses existing
research, both to describe how negotiators typically negotiate, and to
prescribe how they should negotiate.84 He bases his prescriptions on data
drawn from numerous empirical and experimental investigations, but he also
relies quite heavily on vivid anecdotal accounts of negotiations. For
example, he includes anecdotes about Andrew Carnegie, 85 Albert Einstein, 86
Benjamin Franklin,87 Mahatma Gandhi, 88 Donald Trump,89 and Ted
Turner90 . Finally, Shell provides advice aimed at helping negotiators obtain
optimal outcomes for themselves but is also attentive to the impact one's
negotiation behavior may have on others. Whatever their view of these
competing perspectives, most Negotiation teachers will feel comfortable
with the balanced approach Shell takes.
2. Interdisciplinary
Negotiation teachers will also appreciate the way Shell skillfully
integrates social science scholarship into the text of Bargaining for
Advantage. Negotiation is an interdisciplinary subject, yet few Negotiation
teachers have rich backgrounds in more than one or two of the many
disciplines that shed light on the negotiation process. Shell's book goes a
long way toward helping us use other disciplines to teach Negotiation.
82 People are "much more influenced by vivid, concrete information than by pallid and
abstract propositions of substantially greater probative and evidential value." RIcHARD
NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 44 (1980).
83 SHELL, supra note 8, at Part II.
84 Id. ch. 12, at 235-42.
85 Id. at 60-63.
86 Id. at 124-25.
87 Id. at 125-27.
88 Id at 47-49.
89 Id. at 103.
90 Id. at 8-9.
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Drawing from social psychology, cognitive psychology, behavioral
economics, and empirical research on negotiation effectiveness, 91
Bargaining for Advantage explores, among other phenomena, anchoring and
adjustment effects, attribution bias, the consistency principle, the liking rule,
loss aversion, the reciprocity norm, reference points, the scarcity effect, the
similarity principle, and the ultimatum game.
Throughout, Shell explains how negotiators can exploit, and be
exploited by, these phenomena. In other words, Shell teaches both
negotiation "offense" and "defense." For example, Shell uses the scarcity
effect to explain the efficacy of deadlines. Scholars have long observed that
deadlines can have a galvanizing effect on negotiation.92 Shell explains why.
Deadlines are effective, Shell contends, because of the scarcity effect, which
"refers to our human tendency to want things more when we think the supply
is running out."' 93 When forecasters predict a heavy snowstorm, for example,
"it is the scarcity effect that sends people racing to grocery stores to buy up
all the milk and other perishable necessities." 94 In much the same way, when
one negotiator imposes a deadline on the other, she "create[s] the sense that
time is running out on the opportunity. '95 The imposition of the deadline, in
short, triggers the scarcity effect, which urges the recipient of the deadline to
make concessions.
Similarly, Shell uses two phenomena--"contrast effects" and "the
reciprocity norm"--to support his contention that negotiators should make
optimistic, rather than moderate, opening offers in many negotiations. 96
Psychologists have discovered that people tend to evaluate an option more
favorably when it is compared to an inferior option than when it is evaluated
in the absence of such options.97 People's evaluations, in other words, are
influenced by "contrast effects." Thus, Shell explains:
[I]f I want you to pay me $50 for something and I open with a demand of
$75 ... my final $50 offer looks reasonable by comparison with my
opening. If I had opened at $55 instead of $75, and moved down only five
dollars before I stopped, you would be less likely to think you had gotten a
91 Although Bargaining for Advantage does draw from many disciplines, its primary
contribution is to use social psychology - particularly the phenomena described in
Robert Cialdini's book-Influence. CIALDINI, supra note 54.
92 E.g., Gary Goodpaster, Lawsuits as Negotiations, 8 NEGOT. J. 221 (1992).
93 SHELL, supra note 8, at 180.
9 4 Id. at 180.
95 Id. at 181.
96 Id. at 160-61.
97 E.g., Kelman et al., supra note 3, at 288.
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bargain. 98
In short, "[a]n optimistic (but not outrageous) opening sets the other
party up to feel both relief and satisfaction (and thus be more willing to say
'yes') when the realistic settlement range comes into view." 99
Starting optimistically also permits the party making the opening offer to
capitalize on the reciprocity norm, an informal social rule. that says "we
should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us." 100 In
negotiation, Shell explains, "[P]erson A makes an optimistic opening; person
B rejects it. Person A then moderates his demand by making a significant
concession. Person B then feels pressure imposed by the norm of reciprocity
to make a reasonable response, or even to say 'yes."1 0 1 In short, "[t]he norm
of reciprocity induces people to say 'yes' much more frequently after they
have rejected your first demand than when you open with your modest
request." 102
Throughout Bargaining for Advantage, Shell expertly explains
phenomena drawn from various disciplines and describes how they can
shape negotiators' behavior. By integrating theoretical concepts (e.g.,
contrasts effects and the reciprocity norm) with conventional wisdom about
the negotiation process (e.g., optimistic opening offers), Shell provides a
persuasive account of negotiation behavior, both descriptively and
prescriptively.
3. Complement to the Problem-Solving Model of Negotiation
Perhaps most importantly, Negotiation teachers will appreciate the
manner in which Bargaining for Advantage complements the problem-
solving, or principled, negotiation model promulgated in Getting to Yes. It
does so in three distinct ways: first, it addresses topics, Getting to Yes and
other leading works ignore; second, it explains some of the problem-solving
model's core principles; and third, it expands upon some of the model's core
principles.
The first way Bargaining for Advantage complements Getting to Yes is
by addressing some topics it neglects. For example, Shell begins Bargaining
98 SHELL, supra note 8, at 161.
9 9 Id. at 161-62.
100 CIALDINI, supra note 54, at 17.
101 SHELL, supra note 8, at 162.
10 2 Id. For another argument in support of optimistic opening offers, see Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little
Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ONDISP. RESOL. 1, 3-5 (1994).
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for Advantage by focusing on conflict style, an important component of
successful negotiation that Getting to Yes ignores.' 0 3 Although there are
some worthy articles on conflict style, 10 4 the first chapter of Bargaining for
Advantage addresses the topic with uncommon clarity (even if I am more
optimistic than Shell about people's ability to modify their default conflict
styles). Getting to Yes also ignores negotiation ethics, a topic of particular
relevance to the law school-based Negotiation course. Fortunately, Shell's
book provides a particularly thought-provoking analysis of ethical issues
(although it does not attend to some ethical mandates of peculiar concern to
lawyer-negotiators). The second way Bargaining for Advantage
complements Getting to Yes is by providing empirically-grounded
explanations of some of the problem-solving model's central tenets.
Consider, for example, Getting to Yes's advice to develop and use objective
standards or criteria in negotiation. Although Getting to Yes is probably best
known for advising negotiators to engage in interest-based rather than
position-based negotiation, I think its most valuable contribution to lawyer-
negotiators is to urge them to develop and use objective criteria to support
their arguments (especially for those lawyer-negotiators who are not
particularly assertive). 105 Negotiators who attempt to resolve differences, not
through hard bargaining tactics, but rather by advocating for outcomes based
on objective criteria, are likely to convert arbitrary battles of will into
relatively more civil discussions aimed at finding a legitimate basis for
reaching agreement. 106
But "[w]hy are standards and norms," like market value, scientific
judgment, professional standards, custom, precedent, and the like, "such an
important part of bargaining?"'1 7 Getting to Yes does not provide an answer,
but Bargaining for Advantage does. Shell explains that standards have
persuasive power in negotiation because of two phenomena that often
interact with one another: the "consistency principle" 108 and "deference to
authority."109
103 Although Getting to Yes does not address conflict style, it does make claims about
how "hard" and "soft" positional bargainers negotiate. FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 9.
104 See generally Roderick W. Gilkey & Leonard Greenhaigh, The Role of Personality in
Successful Negotiating, 2 NEGOT. J. 245 (1986); Robert H. Mnookin, et al., The Tension
Between Empathy and Assertiveness, 12 NEGOT. J. 217 (1996).
105 FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 81-94.
106 Id. at 81-83.
107 SHELL, supra note 8, at 42.
108 Id. at 42-45.
109 Id. at 52-55.
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The consistency principle refers to the empirical observation that people
have a deep need to "be seen as consistent and rational in the way they make
decisions." 110 We prefer, in other words, to "avoid the disjointed, erratic,
and uncomfortable psychological states that [can] arise when our actions are
manifestly inconsistent with previously expressed, long-held, or widely
shared standards and beliefs." 111 This tendency influences negotiation
behavior. As Shell explains as follows:
Whether we are aware of it or not, we sometimes feel a tug to agree with the
other party when the standards or norms he or she articulates are consistent
with prior statements and positions we ourselves have taken. We also feel
uncomfortable (though we may keep this to ourselves) when the other side
correctly points out that we have been inconsistent in one of our positions or
arguments. In short, standards and norms.., can be strong, motivating
factors in the way negotiations proceed. 112
Widely-used standards or objective criteria are also persuasive in
negotiation because people have a tendency to defer to authority. 113
"Psychologists have discovered a firm fact about human nature," Shell
writes. "We are inclined to defer to authority. Some cultures emphasize
obedience to authority more than others, but even Americans, who tend to be
highly individualistic, defer to authority in many situations." 114 This means
that "[s]tandards and norms have power in negotiation in part because they
carry an authoritative message about what the market, the experts, or society
has determined to be a fair and reasonable price or practice." 115 In short,
Shell provides a persuasive, empirically grounded explanation for why
objective criteria are potent in negotiation.
The third way Bargaining for Advantage complements the Getting to
Yes approach to negotiation is by elaborating upon, or enriching, some of the
problem-solving model's central tenets. For example, Getting to Yes
encourages negotiators to focus on relationships in negotiation by
"separating the people from the problem." 116 Skillful negotiators should
know both how to develop productive working relationships in negotiation
110 Id. at 42. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A T-EORY OF COGNmVE DISSONANCE
(1957) (explaining cognitive dissonance theory).
111 SHELL, supra note 8, at 42.
112 Id. at 43.
113 Id. at 52-53.
1 14 Id. at 53; see also CIALDINI, supra note 54, at 208-36.
115 SHELL, supra note 8, at 53.
116 FSHER & URY, supra note 1, at 17-39.
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and how to deal with relationship problems likely to arise in negotiation.
Getting to Yes focuses on relationship problems, identifying common
perception, emotion, and communication difficulties that may threaten the
negotiation. 117 Bargaining for Advantage, by contrast, focuses on
relationship formation, explaining how negotiators can develop productive
working relationships by taking advantage of the similarity principle,
offering gifts, volunteering to do favors, and importantly, cultivating trust.1 18
Consider also how Getting to Yes and Bargaining for Advantage treat
leverage, a component of negotiation that both books deem critical to
negotiation success.1 19 Both begin by articulating the view that a
negotiator's leverage is inversely related to her need to reach agreement in
negotiation. 120 As Getting to Yes explains, "the relative negotiating power of
two parties depends primarily upon how attractive to each is the option of
not reaching agreement."'121 To increase leverage for oneself, Getting to Yes
contends that negotiators should develop alternatives away from the
bargaining table. Negotiators should, to use the well-known acronym,
improve their "BATNA" or "best alternative to a negotiated agreement,"
because the better their best alternative away from the negotiating table, the
easier it will be to walk away. 122
Shell concedes that "[t]here is wisdom in the BATNA conception of
leverage," and that developing a stronger BATNA can often provide a
negotiator with some leverage. 123 But from Shell's perspective, the analysis
is much more complicated. Negotiators should try not only to increase the
desirability of their alternatives away from the table, but should also attempt
to maximize what he contends are three distinct types of leverage. 124 First,
negotiators may be able to develop "positive" leverage. 125 A negotiator
acquires positive leverage whenever she learns she can provide something
that the other side wants. 126 "Every time the other party says 'I want' in a
negotiation, you should hear the pleasant sound of a weight dropping on
117 Id. at 22-36.
118 SHELL, supra note 8, at 68-72.
119 Id. at xv (referring to leverage as "the most important of all bargaining assets");
FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 97 (noting that no negotiating method "can guarantee
success if all the leverage lies on the other side.").
12 0 See sources cited supra note 1.
121 FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 102.
122 Id.
123 SHELL, supra note 8, at 101.
124 Id. at 102.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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your side of the leverage scales." 127 Second, a negotiator can create
"negative" leverage by successfully threatening the other side with a
potential loss. 128 'Threat leverage gets people's attention because, as astute
negotiators have known for centuries and psychologists have repeatedly
proven, potential losses loom larger in the human mind than do equivalent
gains."129 Third, a negotiator can develop "normative" leverage by framing
proposals within the other party's expressed interests and standards. 130
Normative leverage is a product of the human desire to appear consistent,
fair, and reasonable.131 By manipulating these three forms of leverage, the
negotiator can create the perception that she possesses leverage that the other
side lacks, i.e., that she has less to lose from impasse than from agreeing to
the other side's proposal. In short, Shell's careful exploration of leverage,
much like his exploration of working relationships, enriches the negotiation
approach advanced in Getting to Yes.
B. Weakness
For all its strengths as a law school Negotiation text, Bargaining for
Advantage does suffer from one significant weakness. Like Getting to Yes,
Getting Past No, and other popular negotiation texts' not targeted at law
students and lawyers, Bargaining for Advantage neglects what we might call
"legal negotiations." Shell's book, in other words, ignores some important
negotiation issues of particular relevance to lawyer-negotiators.
Lawyers, for example, conduct most of their professional negotiations on
behalf of clients. Clients are principals, endowed with substantive decision-
making authority, while lawyers function as agents charged with carrying out
their clients' wishes. Shell's book largely ignores the important principal-
agent tensions that can affect lawyer-negotiators and their clients. 132
Additionally, many lawyers are litigators who conduct most of their
professional negotiations in "the shadow of the law" and the legal system. 133
127 Id. at 102.
128 Id. at 103.
129 Id. at 104; see also Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 197-98 (1991); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106
Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991).
130 SHELi, supra note 8, at 104.
131 Id.
132 For a discussion of these tensions, see MNOOKIN E7 AL., supra note 5.
133 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
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Shell does not address any of the important issues that arise as a
consequence, including the impact of such factors as legal endowments,
procedural rules, litigation costs, and the threat of impending trial. Finally,
Shell uses anecdotes to illuminate many of his observations and claims about
negotiation. Seldom, however, does he allude to negotiation anecdotes
directly relevant to the professional lives of most practicing lawyers. As one
of my students put it, '"The examples were good, but not always helpful -
situations we weren't likely to find ourselves in."134
II. How I USE THE BOOK
There is obviously no single way to use Bargaining for Advantage in a
law school Negotiation course. While some may choose to adopt Bargaining
for Advantage as the primary text around which they organize their courses,
others are likely to find that Bargaining for Advantage works better as a
supplemental text. For those in this latter group, I briefly explain below how
I have used the book to enrich my own Negotiation course.
I divide my course into four parts: (1) conflict style; (2) negotiation
theory; (3) negotiation planning; and (4) the role of negotiation in the legal
system. In addition to a number of exercises and simulations, I assign
Getting to Yes, Getting Past No, Bargaining for Advantage, and several
supplemental readings taken primarily from law reviews and books.
A. Conflict Style
I open my Negotiation course by focusing on conflict style. Ideally,
students learn about the five basic conflict styles, gain insight into their own
conflict styles, and develop at least some ability to discern the conflict styles
of those with whom they will negotiate. To accomplish these goals, the
students and I engage in various in-class activities and read the first chapter
of Bargaining for Advantage135 as well as some supplemental reading on
conflict style. 136 Shell's treatment of this topic works well.
134 Letter from Anonymous, J.D. student, Washington University School of Law (on file
with author).
135 SHELL, supra note 8, ch. 1, at 3-21.
136 For example of supplemental readings typically used, see sources cited in note 1.
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B. Negotiation Theory
I devote the bulk of the course to what I call "negotiation theory."
Although I introduce students to positional negotiation and a hybrid
approach I call "advanced negotiation," we spend most of our time focusing
on the problem-solving model of negotiation and the strategies, tactics, and
skills that accompany it.
Relying on Getting to Yes, I explain that the problem-solving or
principled model views negotiation as a collaborative exercise in which the
parties work together to try to devise optimal agreements. 137 This view, in
turn, suggests that negotiators should make four primary moves in
negotiation: (1) separate the people from the problem; (2) focus on interests
rather than positions; (3) generate options; and (4) link outcomes to
objective criteria. 138 Finally, each move or tactic calls for negotiators to use
one primary negotiation skill that my students and I try to develop and refine
through a variety of exercises and simulations including the following: (1)
listening; (2) asking; (3) inventing; and (4) referencing. 139 I supplement
Getting to Yes with the remaining chapters in Part I of Bargaining for
Advantage, as noted below. 140
C. Negotiation Planning
Ideally, negotiation planning precedes negotiation. Nevertheless, it is
easier to teach negotiation planning after introducing students to negotiation
theory and practice. Hence, after teaching negotiation theory, I turn to
planning. In doing so, I assign Shell's chapter on planning141 as well as some
supplemental reading, and the students and I work through a couple of
different planning approaches.
D. Negotiation in the Legal System
Finally, although it has been implicit (and often explicit) throughout, I
devote the last segment of the course to the unique role that negotiation plays
137 FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 13.
13 8 Id.
139 To be clear, Getting to Yes does not link each tactic to the development and use of a
particular negotiation skill. Rather, I have made this link in my Negotiation course for
pedagogical reasons.
140 SHELL, supra note 8, ch. 2-6, at 22-89.
141 Id. ch. 7, at 117-31.
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in the legal system. During this part of the course, the students and I spend
several class hours focusing on, among other things, the lawyer-client
relationship, client interviewing, client counseling, negotiation ethics, and
the role of the lawyer as dispute resolver and deal maker. Here, I use Shell's
outstanding chapter on ethics to supplement other readings.142
E. Sample Syllabus
The following sample syllabus identifies the topics my students and I
address and the readings I assign: Getting to Yes (GTY), Getting Past No
(GPN), Bargaining for Advantage (BFA), and supplemental readings:
Week 1-2: Topic: CONFLICT STYLE
BFA Ch. 1 "The First Foundation: Your Bargaining Style"
Supplemental Readings
Week 3: TOPIC: POSITIONAL NEGOTIATION
Supplemental Readings
Week 4: TOPIC: PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION-SEPARATE
PEOPLE FROM PROBLEM
GTY Ch. 1 "Don't Bargain Over Positions"
GTY Ch. 2 "Separate the PEOPLE from the Problem"
BFA Ch. 4 "Relationships"
Week 5: TOPiC: PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION-FOCUS ON
INTERESTS
GTY Ch. 3 "Focus on INTERESTS, Not Positions"
BFA Ch. 2 "Your Goals and Expectations"
BFA Ch. 5 'The Other Party's Interests"
Week 6: ToPic: PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION---GENERATE
OPTIONS
GTY Ch. 4 "Invent OPTIONS for Mutual Gain"
Week 7: TOPIc: PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION-USE OF
OBJECTIVE CRITERIA
GTY Ch. 5 "Insist on Using Objective CRITERIA"
BFA Ch. 3 "Authoritative Standards and Norms"
142 Id. ch. 11, at 201-34.
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Week 8: Topic: PROBLEM-SOLVING NEGOTIATION-LEVERAGE
GTY Ch. 6 "What If They Are More Powerful?"
BFA Ch. 6 "Leverage"
Week 9: Topic: ADVANCED NEGOTIATION
GPN Entire Text
Supplemental Readings
Week 10: TopiC: NEGOTIATION PLANNING
BFA Ch. 7 "Preparing Your Strategy"
Supplemental Readings
Week 11: ToPIC: NEGOTIATION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM-
LAWYERCLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Supplemental Readings
Week 12: Topic: NEGOTIATION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM-ETHICS
BFA Ch. 11 "Bargaining with the Devil Without Losing
Your Soul"
Supplemental Readings
IV. CONCLUSION
Bargaining for Advantage is a terrific book. Like few other Negotiation
texts, it makes a significant contribution to both the scholarly and popular
literature on the topic and serves as a valuable pedagogical tool. For law
professors who teach Negotiation courses, Bargaining for Advantage is an
option well worth considering.

